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This paper investigates whether economic uncertainty induces a postponement of family 
formation. We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel which provides 
longitudinal information of economic uncertainty and fertility for the period 1984 to 
2004. We employ ‘objective’ measures of uncertainty (unemployment, fixed-term 
contract, low income) as well as ‘subjective’ measures (the feeling that the personal 
economic situation is insecure). Our results suggest that there is no clear indication that 
economic uncertainty generally leads to a postponement of parenthood.  More highly 
educated women tend to postpone family formation when unemployed or when they feel 
insecure about their personal economic situation. However, women with low educational 
levels accommodate themselves quite readily with motherhood when subject to labor 
market insecurities.    
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1  Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, most European countries have witnessed a dramatic shift of 
childbearing to older ages. This development is one of the most significant demographic 
changes that Western industrialized countries have been experiencing. The increase in the 
age at childbirth plays a significant role in the decline of annual fertility rates. It has also 
become evident that the delay in family formation is the prime cause of the recent fertility 
decline in Southern and Eastern Europe (Bongaarts 1999: 256; Sobotka 2004). Fertility 
delay has long-term consequences for completed fertility, given that a late age at first 
birth reduces the chances of having any further children (Marini and Hodson 1981; 
Morgan and Rindfuss 1999).   
Women’s education, employment and career orientation have been identified as 
chief parameters for the increase in the age at childbirth (Rindfuss et al. 1996; Martin 
2000; Gustafsson 2001). In more recent publications, it has been stipulated that youth 
unemployment, term-limited working contracts and unstable employment situations are 
other factors that induce a postponement of childbearing (McDonald 2000: 10f.; De la 
Rica and Iza 2005; Adsera 2004; Blossfeld et al. 2005). Economic uncertainty is also 
regarded to be among the main driving forces behind the fertility postponement and the 
unprecedented decline in period fertility rates which occurred all over Eastern Europe 
after the demise of the communist systems (Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 1995; 
Adler 1997; Ranjan 1999; Kharkova and Andreev 2000). The delay in family formation 
may thus reflect growing uncertainty about the economic future that individuals in 
contemporary societies face.  
However, little empirical evidence exists on the relationship between economic 
uncertainty and fertility. On the macro level, sudden economic downswings have left 
their clear imprint on annual fertility rates. The Great Depression is an example, where a 
sudden increase in unemployment was followed by an erratic drop in birth rates (Kiser 
and Whelpton 1953). The fertility development in East Germany after unification is 
another example (Witte and Wagner 1995; Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2005). It is unclear,   3 
though, if historically exceptional situations of this kind can be generalized. On the 
micro-level, some studies have addressed the role of unemployment in fertility (Hoem 
2000; Santow and Bracher 2001; Kravdal 2002; Vikat 2004; Kurz et al. 2005). Some 
other studies have investigated how fertility intentions are influenced by subjective 
indicators of economic uncertainties (Kohler and Kohler 2002; Speder and Vikat 2005). 
However, hardly any study exists that deals with the impact of subjective measures of 
economic uncertainty on fertility behavior. That there is little micro-level evidence for the 
uncertainty-fertility nexus can particularly be attributed to the strong demand on data 
quality. In order to study how an insecure economic situation affects subsequent 
childbearing, one requires longitudinal data on fertility, attitudes and employment. Such 
data is rarely available.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of economic uncertainties in first 
birth decisions in Germany using event history techniques. We use data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) which provides longitudinal information on fertility, labor 
market characteristics and attitudes for the period 1984 to 2004. We employ ‘objective’ 
measures of uncertainty (unemployment, fixed-term contract, low income) as well as 
‘subjective’ measures (the feeling that the personal economic situation is insecure). A 
major focus of our analysis is on how the effect of economic uncertainty differs by socio-
economic characteristics. Since the SOEP is one of the largest and longest panels in 
Europe, it provides sufficient sample size for such kind of analysis. The paper is 
structured as follows: In the following part, we develop our main research hypotheses. 
Section 3 reviews empirical studies which deal with the uncertainty and fertility nexus. 
Section 4 gives an overview on data and methods. Section 5 presents the empirical 
results. 
   4 
2  Theoretical approaches to economic uncertainty and fertility 
2.1  Classical fertility theories and the economic foundation of parenthood  
There is a long tradition in fertility research which is rooted in the idea that family 
formation requires a secure economic foundation. In his famous ‘essay on population’ 
from 1798, Malthus claimed that food supply and population growth were closely 
interrelated. Although Malthus believed that the chief mechanisms that balanced food 
supply and population growth were starvation, death and poverty, he nevertheless posited 
that economic hardship might induce people to delay marriage and fertility. The idea that 
family formation requires an adequate economic underpinning has also shaped social 
institutions. The ‘western European marriage pattern’ of high percentages of never 
married persons was directly linked to social norms which excluded unskilled laborers 
from the rights to get married (Hajnal 1965). When children were expected to only occur 
within marriage, such regulations were efficient means to limit fertility of those unable to 
support a family by their own means. 
The idea that economic conditions and fertility are related was severely 
challenged by the demographic developments widely known as Europe’s first 
demographic transition, when industrialization and economic growth was accompanied 
by rapid fertility decline. Although it is still disputed what the main courses of the decline 
of fertility are, it is clear that it is somewhat related to reduced benefits of children 
(particularly for old age security), a more conscious control of (marital) fertility, as well 
as to changes in the values parents attach to their off-springs (Coale 1973; Ariès 1980; 
Hirschman 1994). What followed was a situation where income and wealth were linked 
with low rather than high fertility. 
The observation that wealthier persons more strongly limited their fertility called 
for new theoretical approaches. Researchers such as Brentano (1910: 588), Mombert 
(1912: 816ff.) or Mackenroth (1953: 397ff.) speculated about an inverse impact of 
children on social mobility. Leibenstein (1975) and Easterlin (1976) drew on concepts of 
a  ‘relative income’ to explain variations in fertility. The path-breaking work in this 
context was, however, developed by Gary S. Becker (1960). Becker argued that parents   5 
do not only choose the number of children (child quantity). They also choose how much 
time and money they devote to each child (child quality). Becker (1993) assumes that 
with increasing income the demand for child quality increases disproportionately to child 
quantity.  This produces an inverse relationship between income and fertility. 
 
2.2  Women in the focus of contemporary fertility theories  
Since the 1970s, the interest in fertility theory has shifted again. Dirk van de Kaa and Ron 
Lesthaghe have presumably become the most important proponents in fertility theory. 
They observe a fundamental change of values which has swept from northern to southern 
Europe and triggered a fertility decline known as ‘Europe’s second demographic 
transition’. Individualization, self-actualization, individual freedom and women’s 
emancipation range prominently in their theory on fertility decline (van de Kaa 1987; 
Lesthaghe 1995). The labor market development or economic uncertainties are merely 
considered to have a short-term impact on fertility in this conceptual framework. 
Economic fertility theories (in shape of the ‘New Home Economics’) provided a 
theoretical framework which puts women’s employment in the focus of attention (Schultz 
1974). Key assumptions of this framework are that women are chiefly responsible for 
childrearing and men act as providers of the household income. These things given, an 
increase in female employment suppresses fertility. In this framework, the increase in 
women’s engagement in education and employment is the prime cause of the decline in 
fertility in developed countries (Becker 1993: 140; Butz and Ward 1979; Hotz, Klerman 
and Willis 1997: 298ff.). 
The 1960s and 1970s mark an era where public childcare was not available yet 
and fathers were rarely involved in childrearing tasks. One of the most significant social 
changes of this time was the ‘new role of women in society’. Since female emancipation 
and the increase in female employment coincided with a drop in fertility, it seemed only 
obvious to causally relate the two. The usefulness of this concept for studying the fertility 
development in contemporary countries has, however, been questioned recently. It has 
been pointed out that female employment and family life have in many countries become 
more compatible through public and private day care arrangements (Rindfuss et al. 1996;   6 
McDonald 2000). It has also been argued that fertility research has been too preoccupied 
by women’s labor market behavior. Only little attention has been paid to the deteriorating 
labor market performance of the ‘male breadwinner’ in fertility and marriage decisions 
(Oppenheimer et al. 1988; Oppenheimer 2003). 
 
2.3  Resurgence of economic uncertainty in fertility theory  
In more recent years, researchers have (re)discovered economic uncertainty as a cause for 
fertility decline. Particularly Southern and Eastern Europe experienced a drastic drop in 
annual birth rates since the 1990s. It has been suspected that peculiarities of the Southern 
European labor market regimes, which culminate in high youth unemployment and 
precarious employment entry patterns, are related to low fertility rates in these countries 
(McDonald 2000: 10f.; De la Rica and Iza 2004). The labor market uncertainties that 
accompanied the transformation from planned to marked economies are widely regarded 
as a chief determinant of the fertility decline that has swept all over eastern Europe after 
the demise of the communist systems (Eberstadt 1994; Witte and Wagner 1995; Ranjan 
1999; Kharkova and Andreev 2000). Mills and Blossfeld (2005: 1) consider growing 
insecurities as a major overall characteristic of modern societies which has been brought 
about by internationalization and globalization. These uncertainties that young adults face 
“seep into the partnership and parenthood domains of their lives”. Youth unemployment, 
term-limited working contracts and unstable employment situations are thus considered 
to be the primary forces behind the postponement of childbearing in contemporary 
Europe.   
The basic proposition behind this argumentation is that responsible parents will 
have children, when they are able to support a family. Since children are long-term 
commitments, it is not only the current economic situation that matters for fertility, but 
also expectation about the future situation. What still remains unclear in this discussion is 
whether these uncertainties refer to uncertainties in male employment careers, in female 
employment careers, or in both. While previous theoretical concepts have been 
preoccupied with the idea that women’s career orientation is the major force behind the 
fertility decline, new approaches to the role of economic uncertainty stay surprisingly 
mute about gender roles.   7 
2.4  Gender roles and economic uncertainty  
In economic theory, a standard hypothesis has been the ‘male breadwinner assumption’ 
where the woman is responsible for childrearing tasks and the man for providing the 
household income. In this regime, insecurities in male employment should induce couples 
to postpone fertility plans. Since women are expected to be care-givers, labor market 
developments which discourage them from engaging in an own employment career 
should only be beneficial for fertility developments. In that sense, insecurities in female 
employment careers should rather encourage parenthood. 
Another more radical twist of the same argument is the work by Friedman, 
Hechter and Kanazawa (1994: 383ff.). They posit that specifically women with limited 
labor market options respond to unfavorable employment prospects by choosing the 
‘alternative career’ of mothers. Those women are likely to perceive motherhood as a 
strategic choice to structure an otherwise uncertain life course. The most appealing aspect 
of this framework presumably is that it suggests that parenthood is a strategy to reduce 
life course uncertainties. What remains fairly unclear in this model is what the economic 
basis of such families is who opt for parenthood in times of life course insecurities. 
Women who consider an insecure employment situation as a suitable basis for family 
formation will presumably rely on partner income or on public transfers for the 
subsequent life course.  
These considerations nevertheless suggest that there is no universal impact of 
uncertainty on fertility, particularly with respect to insecurities in female employment. On 
the one hand, women with restricted options in the labor market might accommodate 
themselves more readily with the role of mothers (either as single mothers or as 
dependent housewives). This group of women might particularly perceive precarious 
employment as a suitable situation to opt for parenthood. On the other hand, highly 
educated and career oriented educated women will more often consider economic 
independence as a prerequisite for family formation. They are presumably more reluctant 
to rely on partner income (or on public transfers) and will delay fertility decisions when 
they themselves are subject to an insecure labor market situation.     8 
3  Empirical studies on the fertility-uncertainty nexus 
3.1  How economic uncertainty impacts fertility  
Historical demographic literature contains numerous studies which provide evidence for a 
causal relationship between economic conditions and demographic behavior.  For 
countries which followed the ‘western European marriage pattern’, it can be shown that 
economic crisis and hardships had a direct impact on nuptiality and fertility patterns 
(Lynch 1986; Friedlander 1992). For the post-industrialization area, there is much fewer 
evidence of this kind. One of the first micro-level studies which have dealt with the role 
of economic uncertainty in fertility is presumably the ‘Indianapolis Study’ (Kiser and 
Whelpton 1953). This study was prompted by the concern about low birth rates that 
followed the Great Depression in the US. However, the Indianapolis Study did not 
provide particularly strong evidence for the hypothesis that economic uncertainty causes 
low fertility rates. It might have been these discouraging results, but also the fact that 
many countries experienced a fertility boom during the 1950s, that caused researchers to 
loose interest in the relationship between low birth rates and economic uncertainty. 
Since then, the favorite variable in micro-level fertility models has been women’s 
career orientation, frequently measured by female education. Event history type models 
have mostly used education as a time-varying covariate, which distinguishes educational 
level and educational enrolment. These models generally show that educational 
enrolment strongly reduces first birth risks. However, after controlling for educational 
enrolment, no strong independent effect of educational level is usually found (Hoem 
1986; Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Kravdal 1994; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Kreyenfeld 
2004; Lappegård and  Rønsen 2004). Some more recent studies have also addressed how 
female unemployment or income relates to fertility. These studies only provide equivocal 
results (Hoem 2000; Santow and Bracher 2001; Kravdal 2002; Meron and Widmer 2002; 
Kieffer et al. 2005). Vikat (2004) shows that unemployment delays family formation 
among highly educated women in Finland. For other educational groups, unemployment 
fosters family formation. For Sweden, Andersson (2000) shows, for example, that a low 
female income delays fertility.    9 
Male characteristics have only rarely been considered in empirical micro-level 
analysis. This certainly pertains to fertility data which have mostly been collected for 
female respondents only. Studies which contain complete fertility histories of male 
respondents show that a low wage and a low educational attainment negatively influence 
first birth risks in Germany (Huinink 1995; Tölke and Diewald 2003).  Household panels 
that survey the characteristics of all household members also allow for controlling for 
partner characteristics. The disadvantage of this data set up is that one only observes the 
partner’s characteristics after he has moved in with the female respondent. Regarding 
first birth, there is every reason to believe that a selection mechanism operates at this 
threshold already. Males who are disadvantaged in the labor market are also 
disadvantaged in the partner market. 
As to the role of subjective measure of economic uncertainty in fertility, only few 
studies exist. In order to investigate how subjective measures of economic security 
impacts fertility, one requires longitudinal information on both subjective indicators as 
well as respondent’s fertility behavior. There are some cross-sectional studies which have 
analyzed the role of economic uncertainties for fertility intentions (Kohler and Kohler 
2002; Speder and Vikat 2005). However, only few studies have addressed the role of 
subjective measures of economic uncertainty for real behavior.  Exceptions are, for 
example, the studies by Witte and Wagner (1995) or by Bhaumik and Nugent (2002). 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, they investigate whether East 
German respondents who were particularly worried at unification were less likely to opt 
for parenthood in the subsequent years.  Their investigation provides, however, only 
equivocal results. 
 
3.2  How children impact life satisfaction and economic worries 
While there exists only scarce evidence on how economic insecurity impacts fertility, 
there is substantial empirical research work on how marriage and fertility impacts life 
satisfaction. Kohler, Behrman and Skytthe (2005) use a sample of Danish twins to show 
that children impact well-being, accounting for unobserved heterogenity.  Stutzer and 
Frey (2003) show with data from the German-Socio-Economic Panel how marriage   10 
increases subjective well-being. Holst and Trzcinski (2005) show with the same data set 
that the arrival of the first child increases life satisfaction.   
Figure 1 shows similar results of a logistic regression model. One of the 
dependent variables is a binary variable for being satisfied with life. The other variable is 
a binary for being very worried about the personal economic situation (for the full model, 
see Table A1 in the Appendix). The graph shows that the arrival of the first child marks a 
drastic increase in life satisfaction. Life satisfaction skyrockets with the birth of the first 
child, hence it quickly levels off thereafter. Surprisingly, economic worries do not seem 
to increase significantly after childbirth.  
Economic worries and life satisfaction will also range prominently in the 
subsequent analysis of first birth determinants. That subjective well-being is responsive 
to childbearing has also major implications for the study of first birth risks. It underlines 
that one needs to correctly take into account the temporal order between attitudes and 
subsequent childbearing. If one investigates how well-being impacts fertility, attitudes 
need to be measured clearly before pregnancy. Otherwise one will find a positive 
correlation between the two factors which will merely be attributed to the fact that the 
arrival of the first child makes people happy. 
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Source: Estimates from logistic regression model (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details).   11 
4  Data, method and covariates  
In order to investigate how economic uncertainties impact the transition to first birth, we 
use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is one of the 
longest household panels in Europe (for details see SOEP-Group 2001). It currently 
provides longitudinal information for the period 1984 until 2004. The first wave of the 
SOEP was launched in 1984 encompassing 4,500 West German households (sample A) 
and an oversample of roughly 1,500 West German households with a foreign household 
head (sample B). Since 1984, the SOEP has been supplemented by several subsamples. 
For example in 1990, an ‘East German sample’ (sample C) has been added. In 1995, an 
‘immigrant sample’ (sample D) was drawn. For the analysis in this study, we use 
respondents from the western German sample and the foreigner sample (sample A and 
sample B). 
The SOEP is a panel study in which individuals are re-interviewed on an annual 
basis. It includes a battery of questions on employment, income, labor market 
characteristics, attitudes and household compositions. Most items are surveyed in a 
similar manner each year. This allows utilizing a large set of longitudinal information on 
a person’s characteristics (see below). For fertility analysis, it is also vital to have 
information on the parity of a person when he or she enters the study. This information 
also is available from the SOEP. For sample A and B, complete fertility histories of 
women were surveyed. Since men’s fertility histories were not recorded for members of 
sample A and B, we restrict the analysis to female respondents. Hence, we take into 
account the characteristics of the partner the woman is cohabiting with. 
For some selected variables, such as source of income or activity status, the SOEP 
provides monthly information. For most other variables, information is surveyed for the 
date of interview only. In other words, the respondent is requested to give his or her 
current employment status or labor market position. Respondents are also requested to 
report if they are currently worried about their economic situation. For the time period 
between panel waves, we obviously do not have any information on the worries of the 
respondent. For simplicity, we assume that a person’s characteristics which have been 
reported at the time of interview are fixed during the last and the following six months.   12 
Figure 2 visualizes this procedure. In this example, the first interview was conducted in 
April 1984 and the respondent reports that she is not worried when she thinks about her 
personal economic situation. This respondent experiences several changes in respect to 
her worries. In February 1988, the woman gives birth to her first child and when she is 
interviewed in April 1988, she is worried about her economic situation.  In order to 
guarantee that attitudes are measured −  for all cases −  before pregnancy, we backdate the 
date of birth by twelve months. By this procedure, we make sure that we avoid reversed 
causation of economic uncertainty and fertility.  
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Method 
We employ event history techniques to investigate how education, employment, partner 
characteristics and economic uncertainty impacts first birth risks. The process starts at 
age 18 and it ends at first pregnancy.
1 Cases are censored when a person drops out of the 
sample or at age 45. For the specification of the baseline hazard, we use a piecewise 
constant function. We restrict the multivariate analysis to the time period respondents are 
part of the panel study. This means that some cases are left-censored. For example, a 
woman who is born in 1960 is 24 year of age when she comes under observation in 1984. 
There are 2898 cases under observation.  For these 2898 cases, we observe 963 first 
births.  For some parts of the analysis, we only take into account periods during which the 
partner of the respondent lives in the same household.  For this kind of analysis, we have 
1547 women and 627 births at our disposal.   
 
Covariates 
One of our key interests in this study is the impact of economic uncertainty on fertility. 
We measure economic uncertainty by two different kinds of variables.  We take into 
account general life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured on an ordinal scale in the 
SOEP. Respondents could choose values 0 through 10, where 0 indicates a low 
satisfaction with life and 10 indicates high life satisfaction. We grouped this variable into 
the categories low satisfaction (0-3), medium satisfaction (4-7) and high satisfaction (8-
10). The disadvantage of life satisfaction is that it is only indirectly linked to the personal 
economic situation. The central variable for measuring economic uncertainty is a variable 
that indicates if a person reports that she is worried, somewhat worried or not worried 
when she thinks about her personal economic situation. This variable has several merits.  
It is surveyed for all respondents. Furthermore, it is among the few variables that have 
                                                 
1   In order to guarantee, that we avoid reversed causation, we backdate the date of birth by nine month.  
Therefore, we rather study first pregnancy risks than first birth risks.  For improved readability, we 
refer to ‘first birth risks’ in the description of the results.    14 
been surveyed every year. Also it is phrased in the same way over the panel waves.
2 If 
one looks at the percentage of women who are very worried, there is a substantial 
increase from 2000 to 2004. Compared to West Germans, foreigners tend to be more 
worried about their personal economic situations (Figure 3).  
 












Notes: The sample comprises women aged 18-45.  
Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (sample A and B) 
 
We consider three types of ‘objective measures’ of economic uncertainty which are 
unemployment, a fixed term contract and a low income. The employment status 
encompasses the categories in education, employed full-time, employed part-time and 
                                                 
2   The exact wording of the question is as follows: ‘Wie ist es mit folgenden Gebieten? Machen Sie 
sich da Sorgen? Um ihre eigene wirtschaftliche Situation. Große Sorgen/ einige Sorgen/  keine 
Sorgen.’   15 
unemployed.
3  If a respondent reports to be employed and to attend university at the same 
time, we only consider the respondent’s educational participation.  Respondents who are 
employed are distinguished by whether they are holding a fixed term contract or a 
permanent working contract.  Monthly gross wage was deflated by the price index of the 
German Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2005).  The base year is the year 
2000. We only consider the monthly gross income of the full-time employed which we 
classified into the categories 0 up to 2000 Euro, 2000 Euro up to 3000 Euro, 3000 Euro 
up to 5000 Euro and more than 5000 Euro. 
We also consider the partner's characteristics.  The variables for the partner were 
constructed similarly to the woman's characteristics.  For the male partner, educational 
participation also encompasses military service, though. Furthermore, we cannot 
distinguish between full-time and part-time employment, given the low number of males 
working part-time. The partner's characteristics are included only for the time period the 
woman is cohabiting with the partner.  If the partner moves out, his characteristics are no 
longer considered.  If a new partner moves in with the respondent, only his characteristics 
are taken into account.   
Control variables in our model are calendar period, nationality and female 
education.  Calendar period was grouped into the years 1984 to 1990, 1991 to 1996 and 
1997 to 2003.  The last date of interview is the beginning of 2004.  Since we backdate the 
date of childbirth (and of censoring) by twelve months, the year 2004 is not covered in 
our analysis.  Women’s educational level was measured by a categorical variable that 
distinguishes high level (‘Abitur’), medium level (‘Realschulabschluss’) or low level 
(‘Hauptschulabschluss’ or less).  A ‘Realschulabschluss’ or a ‘Hauptschulabschluss’ is 
usually earned around age 16.  The ‘Abitur’ is earned around age 18 and qualifies for 
university education.  Even though a school degree is usually earned before age 18, we 
treat this variable as a time-varying covariate. This means that until respondents have 
finished school, they are classified as ‘low level’. 
                                                 
3    We also grouped ‘other types of non-employment’ into the category of women who are 
unemployed.  Before first pregnancy, there were rather few women who belong to this category.  
Omitting this category completely from the analysis did not change our results in any substantial 
manner.   16 
5  Results 
5.1  Insecurities in female employment careers and fertility postponement  
In the following empirical analysis, we investigate how objective and subjective 
measures of economic uncertainty influence first birth risks.  Table 1 displays the results 
of a model which includes the characteristics of the female respondent.  We estimate five 
different models which each contain a different measure of economic uncertainty.  Model 
1 includes the employment status.  Model 2 contains a combination factor of employment 
status and type of work contract. Model 3 contains a combination factor of the 
employment status and the monthly gross wage.  By ‘combination factor’, we mean that 
we combined the wage information and the employment status into a single variable.   
Model 4 and 5 contain the subjective indicators. We did not include all types of 
insecurities in a single model, because our variables partially overlap and measure similar 
aspects.     
Let us first turn to the control variables.  There is a bell-shaped impact of age on 
first birth risks. The hazards for family formation (or rather first pregnancy) are highest in 
the age bracket 25 to 28.  The age profile is pronounced, but it would be stronger if one 
had not controlled for the partnership status, which also relates to age.  Having a partner 
who lives in the same household has a distinct and marked impact on first birth risks.  A 
partner increases the transition rate to the first child by the factor 3. Vice versa, having no 
partner reduces first birth risks by roughly 70 percent. Nationality has a significant 
impact on first birth risks, with foreigners encountering a first birth risk that is elevated 
by more than 30 percent. We only find a modest decline in first birth risks since the 
1980s. A model that includes only age and calendar period (not presented here) shows a 
slightly more pronounced impact of the calendar period on first birth risks, suggesting 
that an increase in female education explains some of the changes in first birth rates over 
time. The educational level shows a negative and significant gradient. Since educational 
enrollment is controlled for, this result suggests that the highly educated more strongly 
postpone parenthood after completion of education.    17 
In line with other studies, we find that first birth risks are particularly low during 
educational participation. Compared to full-time employment, first birth risks are reduced 
by 60 percent when enrolled in education.  Apart from this very pronounced impact of 
educational participation, none of the other employment variables have any substantial 
impact on first birth risks. Part-time employment somewhat lowers first birth risks, but 
this results is statistically not significant. Partially, this might be related to the low 
number of women working part-time before their first child is born. A similar aspect 
applies to the type of working contract. This variable is not significant and here also, 
there are fairly few respondents who are holding term-limited working contracts. 
Woman’s gross labor market income does not seem to impact first birth risks, 
either. A classical expectation on this issue would be that high female wages increase the 
opportunity costs of childbearing and lower the chances of a first birth for a woman. If 
one assumes, however, that particularly highly educated women are able to resolve the 
incompatibility between childrearing and employment, the situation is less clear-cut.  In 
that case, one could argue that highly educated women postpone childbearing until they 
have reached a high income. In essence, wages depend on age as well as on educational 
attainment. The interrelation between wage, age and income is not sufficiently addressed 
in a model which treats education, income and age as variables that have an independent 
impact on first birth risks.  We will come back to this issue in the subsequent analysis. 
Model 4 includes the variable that indicates whether the personal economic 
situation is insecure, Model 5 the variable that indicates general life satisfaction. None of 
these indicators suggest that there is any impact of subjective measures of economic 
uncertainty on first birth fertility in western Germany.  The quintessence of this is that 
neither the objective measures of economic uncertainty (fixed term contract, 
unemployment, a low labor market income) nor the subjective measures of economic 
uncertainty are related to first birth risks, neither in a positive nor in a negative manner.   18 
Table 1: Results from event history model, relative risks of the transition to first birth  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Age                      
  18-20  0.81 * 0.81 * 0.81 * 0.81 * 0.81 * 
  21-24  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.90  
  25-28  1  1   1   1   1   
  29-32  0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 0.67 *** 
  33-45  0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 
                
Calendar Period                
  1984-1990  1  1   1   1   1   
  1991-1996  0.90  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  
  1997-2003  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98  
                
Nationality                
   German  1  1   1   1   1   
   Foreigner   1.33 *** 1.33 *** 1.34 *** 1.33 *** 1.34 *** 
                
Educational  level                
  Low level  1  1   1   1   1   
  Medium level  0.87 * 0.87 * 0.87 * 0.87 * 0.84 * 
  High level  0.84 * 0.84 * 0.84 * 0.85 * 0.87 * 
                
Partnership status                
  Partner  1  1   1   1   1   
  No (cohabiting)  partner  0.33 *** 0.34 *** 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.34 *** 
              
Employment status              
  In education  0.40 ***       0.40 *** 0.40 *** 
  Employed full-time   1       1   1   
  Employed part-time  0.77       0.77  0.78  
  Not employed   1.07       1.06  1.08  
             
Work contract             
  In education      0.37 ***         
  Not employed    0.99           
  Employed                 
  -- fixed-term contract     1            
  -- unlimited contract    0.88           
             
Monthly gross wage              
  In education          0.42 ***      
  Not employed          1.13      
  Employed part-time          0.82      
  Employed full-time                
  -- 0-2000Euro        1.06      
  -- 2000-3000 Euro        1       
  -- 3000 - 5000 Euro        1.04      
  -- more than 5000 Euro          1.15       
             
Economic worries              
  Very worried           1     
  Somewhat worried           0.91    
  Not worried           0.95    
             
Life satisfaction              
  Low (values 0-2)             1   
  Medium (values 3-7)             0.87  
  High (values 8-10)             0.94  
Notes: ***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10. Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
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5.2  The differential effect of economic uncertainty on family formation  
Following our theoretical presumptions, the impact of economic uncertainty should vary 
by women’s career orientation. Women who can accommodate themselves with the role 
of housewives might not be particularly affected in their fertility plans by own labor 
market insecurities. Only women who consider economic independence as a prerequisite 
for family formation will delay parenthood, if they feel that the personal economic 
situation is insecure. Women with a higher education can generally expect to receive 
higher wages. It also seems reasonable to assume that, if female economic independence 
is a prerequisite for family formation, it is a matter for the highly educated. In order to 
address how insecurities vary by women’s career orientation, we interact indicators of 
economic uncertainty with the woman’s educational level.  For the type of work contract, 
there were too few cases available, which is why we did not perform any interactions 
with this variable.   
Table 2 reports an interaction of education and employment status. For this 
interaction, we had to group women employed part-time and full-time into one category 
to provide a sufficiently high sample size. There is clear-cut evidence with respect to the 
effect of educational participation. For all educational categories, educational enrolment 
lowers first birth risks significantly.  Employment also has a similar impact across all 
educational levels. The great difference lies in the impact of unemployment. For highly 
educated women, first birth risks are significantly reduced if they are unemployed.     
Compared to employed women with a high educational level, their unemployed 
counterparts experience a first birth risks that is reduced by 60 percent.
4 For women with 
a medium educational level, we do not find much of an impact of unemployment on 
fertility rates. For women with a low educational level, however, unemployment seems to 
increase the transition rate to the first child.  Compared to employed women with a low 
educational level, first birth risks are elevated by 25 percent for their unemployed 
counterparts.   
 
                                                 
4   The relative risk of being unemployed for the highly educated is calculated by dividing the relative 
risks of unemployment (0.38) by the relative risks of employment (0.95), which equals 0.4.  First 
birth risks are therefore lowered by 60 percent (1-0.4)*100).     20 
Table 2: Relative first birth risks. Model with interaction effects between female 
education and employment status 
  Education 
 Low  Medium  High 
Employment status      
  In education  0.45 *** 0.37 *** 0.33  *** 
  Employed   1  0.90  0.95   
  Unemployed  1.25 * 0.96   0.38 ** 
Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status. 
***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 provide the interaction of the subjective measures of economic 
uncertainty and educational level.  It supports the presumption that economic worries 
particularly impact first birth risks among the highly educated.  For women with a low 
educational level, the effect is rather vice versa.  For example, first birth risks of women 
with an ‘Abitur’ are reduced by roughly 40 percent if they are worried about their 
personal economic situation (compared to being not worried).  For women with a low 
educational level, first birth risks increase by 13 percent if they are very worried.  For life 
satisfaction, the pattern is similar in the sense that a low life satisfaction seems only to 
prevent more highly educated women from having children.  Low scores on life 
satisfaction strongly discourage highly educated women from having children.  Lowly 
educated women with a low life satisfaction seem to be particularly amenable to the idea 
of parenthood. 
 
Table 3: Relative first birth risks. Model with interaction effects between female 
education and economic worries 
  Education 
 Low  Medium  High 
Economic worries      
  Very worried  1  0.88  0.53  ** 
  Somewhat worried  0.83  0.78 * 0.69  * 
  Not worried  0.88  0.66 *** 0.87   
Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, employment status.  
***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
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Table 4: Relative first birth risks. Model with interaction effects between female 
education and life satisfaction  
  Education 
 Low  Medium  High 
Life Satisfaction      
  Low (values 0-2)  1  0.30 * 0.31   
  Medium (values 3-7)  0.61  0.52 ** 0.50  ** 
  High (values 8-10)  0.64  0.58 * 0.56  * 
Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, employment status.  
***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
 
Table 5 reports the interaction of education and monthly gross income. As in the previous 
analysis, we only consider the wages of the full-time employed.  If the assumption is 
correct that highly educated women seek a secure economic position to have children, 
one would expect that low wages will defer their fertility plans.  One finds rather modest 
support for this presumption. Women with an ‘Abitur’ and an income of more than 5000 
Euro encounter elevated first birth risks. Since this category is rather small, it is not 
surprising that these results are insignificant.  The income-fertility nexus is, complicated 
by the fact that educational level and income are closely intervened. This becomes very 
obvious when one considers that the combination ‘low educational level’ and ‘income of 
more than 5000 Euro’. We cannot provide estimates for this combination, since there are 
too few cases with such characteristics.   
 
Table 5: Relative first birth risks. Model with interaction effects between female 
education and monthly gross wage (of the full-time employed) 
  Education 
 Low  Medium  High 
Monthly gross wage      
  0-2000 Euro  1.10    0.96    1  
  2000-3000 Euro  1.00    0.93    0.94  
  3000- 5000 Euro  0.98    1.00    0.93  
  more than 5000 Euro  --    0.89    1.35  
Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, educational participation and part-time 
employment 
***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
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5.3  Insecurities in the partner’s employment careers and fertility postponement  
While it might not come as a surprise that insecurities in female employment careers have 
an ambivalent impact on fertility, there should be less ambiguities with respect to the role 
of insecurities in male employment. In most countries, and in western Germany in 
particular, the male breadwinner model is the dominant living arrangement of families.  
Mother’s employment rates differ by educational level, but nevertheless, women strongly 
reduce their employment after childbirth.  Even in the year 2002, only about a quarter of 
West German women with children below age 3 are employed (Geisler and Kreyenfeld 
2005).  If they work, they rarely engage in full-time employment.  Against this 
background, one would expect that particularly insecurities in male employment make 
couples postpone their fertility plans.   
In order to address this issue empirically, we estimate several event history 
models where we control for the partner’s characteristics.  For this investigation, we only 
have the partner’s characteristics for the time he is co-residing with the female 
respondent.  This limits our analysis to the segments in women’s lives when they have 
partners.   This also means that one disregards births that occur outside of a (cohabiting) 
union.  Since, one could assume that female and male characteristics are somewhat 
related, we first estimate models which only includes partner’s characteristics.  The last 
model then also includes female employment status and education. 
Table 6 presents the results. Somewhat surprisingly, male educational attainment 
has a negative (but insignificant) impact on first birth rates.  In general, one could expect 
that more highly educated males have high income and therefore better chances of setting 
up a family early in life.  That we do not find this positive gradient might point to several 
aspects. One explanation could be that we only take into account the male’s 
characteristics after entry into a co-residential union.  Since less educated males are 
disadvantaged on the partner market, the analysis is selective in respect to partner 
characteristics.  The results could also relate to educational homogamy. Men with a high 
‘earning potential’ often live with women who have similar characteristics. Although the 
man might have the earning potential to support a family, the female partner’s career 
ambition (and the incompatibility of it with childrearing) works in the opposite direction.  
One would be able to resolve this issue if one accounted for female characteristics.  After   23 
controlling for female education and employment (Model 4), the coefficient for male 
education indeed increases slightly.  However, it does not become positive, which one 
would expect if male earning potentials played indeed such a strong role in fertility, as it 
is often predicted.  A very likely explanation seems to be that more highly educated men 
invest more in their career development during which they refrain from fatherhood. This 
would indicate that incompatibilities between career advancement and fertility also exist 
for males.   
Similar to female educational participation, male educational participation 
suppresses the likelihood of parenthood. First birth risks are reduced by roughly 25 
percent if the partner is receiving education or is doing his military service.  This impact 
seems less strong than for female educational participation (, in the previous analysis, we 
showed that woman’s educational participation reduces first birth risks by 60 percent). 
One needs to consider, though, that we only take into account periods when males are in 
a union. This substantially reduces the time of exposure in education for the male 
partner’s characteristics.   
Surprisingly, male employment status does not have the expected strong impact 
on first birth risks.  Unemployment does not seem to have an impact on first birth risks at 
all.  Only after controlling for female characteristics does male unemployment show the 
expected sign, in the sense that it reduces first birth risks.  A similar matter applies to the 
impact of an unlimited working contract that has no impact on first birth risks.  There is a 
somewhat positive impact of income on fertility.  Compared to a high monthly income 
(3000-5000 Euro), a very high income (more than 5000 Euro) increases first birth risks 
by 25 percent.  Apart from this pronounced impact of a very high income on fertility, the 
other income groups do not differ significantly.  The relationship between male income 
and fertility is complicated by the close interrelation between age, education and income.   
One can, nevertheless, asses that the monthly income of the male partner does not seem 
to be such a powerful and straightforward predictor for first birth risks than one would 
expect to be the case in a ‘male breadwinner regime’.     24 
Table 6: Results from event history model, relative risks of the transition to first birth, 
women with cohabiting partners  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Age  (of woman)                 
  18-20  0.99  0.94  0.99  1.05  
  21-24  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.94  
  25-28  1  1   1   1   
  29-32  0.67 *** 0.66 *** 0.65 *** 0.64 *** 
  33-45  0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 
             
Calendar Period             
  1984-1990  1  1   1   1   
  1991-1996  0.87  0.86  0.87  0.90  
  1997-2003  1.09  1.05  1.07  1.12  
             
Nationality (of woman)             
   German  1  1   1   1   
   Foreigner   1.39 *** 1.37 *** 1.41 ** 1.28 ** 
             
Partner’s 
Educational  level            
  Low level  1  1   1   1   
  Medium level  0.83  0.83  0.82  0.85  
  High level  0.87  0.86  0.84  0.92  
            
Partner’s 
Employment status           
  In education  0.76 *          
  Employed full-time   1           
  Not employed   1.04           
            
Partner’s 
Work contract          
  In education      0.78        
  Not employed    1.06        
  Employed              
  -- fixed-term contract     1         
  -- unlimited contract    1.04        
Partner’s 
Monthly gross wage             
  In education          0.79  0.85  
  Not employed          1.05  0.74  
  Employed                
  -- 0-2000Euro          1.16  1.16  
  -- 2000-3000 Euro          1  1   
  -- 3000 –  5000  Euro       1.00  0.99  
  -- more than 5000 Euro        1.25 * 1.21  
             
Woman’s 
 Educational  level              
  Low level           1   
  Medium level           0.96  
  High level           0.92  
             
Woman’s 
Employment status              
  In education           0.57 *** 
  Employed full-time            1   
  Employed part-time           0.99  
  Not employed            1.41 * 
Notes: ***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 1984-2004 (own estimates) 
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6  Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to investigate how economic uncertainty induces fertility 
delay.  Fertility theory has been rooted in the idea that fertility decisions require a secure 
economic foundation, which was usually considered to be an adequate, secure 
employment position of the ‘male breadwinner’.  Female employment was often 
approached via the ‘opportunity cost argument’ in which the labor market participation of 
women suppresses fertility. In this framework, women’s employment and career 
orientation is the greatest threat to a country’s reproductive level.  Vice versa, low female 
wages, high female unemployment and bad employment chances for women should only 
be beneficial for high birth rates.   
A standard assumption behind this thinking is that women are unable to bring in 
synch employment and childrearing.  Women who are career oriented and emancipated 
stay childless in this framework.  In contemporary societies, the compatibility of 
childrearing and employment has become somewhat more compatible due to a better 
access to private and public day care arrangements. Given that a family life and a 
working career have become more compatible, the more highly educated might not 
refrain from parenthood altogether. Instead they will try to accommodate the role of 
workers and mothers. For these women, economic independence and a secure 
employment situation might be particularly important for having children.  It is for these 
women, that one would expect that labor market uncertainties have the strongest 
repercussions on their reproductive behavior.   
The empirical results of this paper provide an ambivalent view.  There is no 
evidence that insecurities in female employment careers generally impact first birth 
decisions. There are, however, interaction effects between educational level and 
economic uncertainties. Unemployment strongly defers fertility plans among the highly 
educated women. Being worried about the own personal situation has also a very 
profound impact on fertility behavior of those with higher educational levels.  If a woman 
with an ‘Abitur’ (high level) feels worried about her personal economic situation or if she 
is not satisfied with her life as such, she will most likely postpone parenthood. For   26 
women with a ‘Realschulabschluss’ (medium level), the subjective feeling of economic 
uncertainty plays a rather insignificant role for the decision to have a first child.   
It is a striking result that among the lowly educated women, economic uncertainty 
accelerates fertility decisions.  Women with a ‘Hauptschulabschluss’ or without a school 
degree are very likely to become pregnant when they are unemployed, when they worry 
about their personal economic situation or when they are rather unsatisfied with their life 
as such. This result points to an argument developed by Friedman, Hechter and 
Kanazawa (1994) who posit that disadvantaged subgroups of the population choose 
parenthood as a strategy to structure their otherwise uncertain life course.  
The empirical results of partner’s characteristics gives rather weak support for the 
hypothesis that couples generally postpone fertility until the male breadwinner has 
reached a high labor market income or a secure employment situation. After controlling 
for female characteristics, there is a negative (but insignificant) impact of male 
unemployment on first birth risks.  There is also a pronounced elevated fertility risk for 
women with partners with an income of more than 5000 Euro. However, the general 
results on the impact of male labor market uncertainties in the delay in fertility are less 
straightforward than one would expect to be the case.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Results from logistic regression model on life satisfaction and economic worries  
  High Life Satisfaction  Economic Worries 
  Model 1a   Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2a 
Age of first child              
  Childless  1  1   1   1    
  Age 0-1   2.35 ** 2.43 ** 0.57  0.49  
  Age 2-3   0.97  1.07  1.24  0.96  
  Age 4-6  0.76  0.81  1.04  0.89  
  Age 7-12  0.90  0.99  1.39  1.11  
  Age 12+  0.86  0.95  1.30 * 1.00  
             
Age of respondent             
  Age 18-25  1.55 *** 1.55 *** 0.89  0.87  
  Age 26-35  1  1   1   1   
  Age 36-45   0.88  0.88  1.02  1.04  
  Age 46-55  0.83  0.77 * 0.86  1.01  
  Age 56-65  0.98  0.91  0.50 *** 0.59 *** 
  Age 65+  1.06  0.98  0.45 ** 0.52 *** 
             
Nationality             
  Foreigner  1  1   1   1   
  German  1.22  1.10  0.67 ** 0.88  
             
Region             
  East Germany  0.59 *** 0.64 *** 1.73 *** 1.42 *** 
  West Germany   1  1   1   1   
             
Family status             
 Married  1  1   1   1   
 Divorced, separated, widowed  0.71 *** 0.77 *** 1.69 *** 1.34 *** 
 Single  0.62 *** 0.69 *** 1.42 ** 1.09  
             
Employment status             
  In education  1.01  0.88  0.82  1.20  
  Employed full-time  1  1   1   1   
  Employed part-time  1.01  0.92  0.79  1.01  
  Not employed  0.96  0.93  0.83  0.92  
  Registered unemployed  0.32 *** 0.34 *** 3.83 *** 3.49 *** 
             
Education             
  No degree  0.80 ** 0.85  1.19  1.04  
  Vocational degree  1  1   1   1   
  University degree  1.53 *** 1.34 ** 0.62 *** 0.83  
            
Equivalent household income            
 0-1000 Euro      1     1   
 1000-1500 Euro      1.27 **     0.49 *** 
 1500-2000 Euro      1.65 ***     0.29 *** 
 More than 2000 Euro      2.01 ***     0.15 *** 
               
  Number of cases  4035    4035    4029  4029   
  Percentage satisfied/ worried  44.0%    44.0%    24.9%  24.9%   
Notes: The sample comprises women aged 18 and older.  The dependent variable in Model 1a is a binary variable for 
‘high life satisfaction’. Life satisfaction was measured on a scale which ranks from the values 0 to 10. ‘High life 
satisfaction’ refers to the values 8 through 10. The reference category includes the values 0 through 7. The dependent 
variable in Model 1b is a binary variable for being very worried about the economic situation. The reference category is 
being somewhat worried or being not worried.   
***: p ≤  0.01 **: 0.01≤  p ≤  0.05 *: 0.05≤  p ≤ 0.10.  Source: SOEP 2004, sample F (own estimates) 
 